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This paper studies the determinants of individual bank failures and M&A processes in 
Colombia during the financial crisis of the late 1990s. Using bank-specific data we 
estimate competing risk hazards models and find that while profitability and 
capitalization are the most important determinants of the probability of failing, bank´s 
size, efficiency and capitalization are the main determinants of the probability of 
participating in an integration process. All else constant, an increase in capitalization 
reduces the probability of disappearing, whether due to the occurrence of bankruptcy, 
a merge or an acquisition. However, a marginal increase in capitalization reduces 
significantly more the probability of bankruptcy than the probability of integration. 
This study is the first to present a competing risks hazard model to identify covariates 
that excerpt significant influence on the probability of failing or merging for banks of 
an emerging economy. 
JEL classification: G21; G33; G33; C25 
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1.  Introduction 
Bank failures and bank mergers and acquisitions have been studied widely. However, 
most of the existing studies focus on two-state worlds where only two outcomes are 
possible
3. While research on bank failure concentrates of finding the factors that 
influence the transition of a surviving bank to liquidation (Lane et al, 1986; Whalen, 
1991; González-Hermosillo et al, 1996; Carree, 2003; Gómez-González and Kiefer, 
2009), research on mergers and acquisitions in the financial intermediation industry 
focuses on finding the factors that determine the participation of a bank in an integration 
process (Ayala et al, 2007, and Hannan and Pilloff, 2009). Both types of studies omit a 
third state of the world. The first type of studies do not consider the possibility that a 
bank in distress can participate in a merging process as a safeguard, while the second 
type of studies do not consider the possibility of failure. In both cases, the omission of 
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3 A notable exception is Wheelock and Wilson (2000), who use US banks´ data and estimate a competing 
risks model to consider the joint determination of the probability of failing, being acquired, or surviving. an important third state can lead to biased estimates of the migration probabilities (Khor 
and Penkavel, 2006). 
In this paper we use duration analysis and competing risks models to simultaneously 
find the significant determinants of the probabilities of failing or participating in an 
integration (M&A) process for financial institutions in Colombia. We use an especially 
rich data set comprised of monthly information on banks´ balance sheets for the period 
January 1997 – December 2000. During that time span Colombia experienced a severe 
financial crisis that led to a significant contraction and concentration of the country´s 
financial system
4.  Our hypothesis is that during times of financial stress some 
institutions participate in integration processes as a strategy to survive. However, not all 
institutions are allowed to participate in such processes. Particularly, those banks whose 
financial health deteriorates profoundly do not find partners to merge and are not 
acquired, and therefore are more likely to be liquidated than peers in better financial 
conditions. 
The case of Colombia is worthy of studying because during the late 1990s and early 
2000s many bankruptcies and M&A processes took place in the financial sector, due to 
the financial crisis and to the process of consolidation of an incipient banking system. 
We focus our attention in the period of financial stress for two reasons. First, between 
1997 and 2000 there is a sufficiently large proportion of failures and integrations to 
identify and measure significant effects of financial variables. And second, from the 
supervisor´s or regulator´s viewpoint, interest relies in identifying the variables that 
determine the probability of observing a bank failure after the occurrence of a negative 
shock that affects the financial system. When a bank is under stress, liquidation is just 
one of three possible outcomes, which include participation in an integration process 
and survival
5. However, the probability of participating in an M&A (and of failing, and 
of surviving) may be different during times of stress and on average times. Therefore, 
using a larger time-span could produce biased estimates of the probabilities under the 
question of interest in this study. 
An additional advantage of focusing in a period of financial crisis is that we can exclude 
macroeconomic covariates that control for the stage of the business cycle from the 
empirical analysis. We assume that the effect of the variation in the stage of the cycle 
(that must be lower when only a period of recession is considered than if a larger time-
span were considered) is captured by its direct effect on microeconomic covariates and 
by the baseline hazard function, common to all the institutions under analysis. The 
                                                            
4 As a consequence of the crisis, the number of institutions, 138 in January 1997, dropped to only 57 in 
December 2001, after failures, mergers and acquisitions. Total assets of the financial system experienced 
a real contraction of more than 20 percent during the same period, making that episode of financial stress 
the deepest financial crisis experienced by the country in the last century (Gómez-González and Kiefer, 
2009). 
 
5 We consider participating in an integration process as a different outcome from survival, because in an 
integration process the participating institutions merge into a new institution different from those that 
existed before. Indeed, the decision to participate in an integration process is different from the decision 
to maintain the firm´s corporate structure and wait and see if the institution survives or not. exclusion of macroeconomic variables allows us to use a hazard duration model with 
time-fixed covariates. With the model we construct here we can provide answers to 
questions that are relevant for both financial supervisors and financial institutions, such 
as: after the occurrence of a negative shock, what is the probability that a bank fails (or, 
alternatively, participates in an M&A process) in the following months, given it has 
survived up to that moment? Or, what is the predicted time to failure (alternatively, 
participation in an M&A process) for a bank of some given characteristics? A model 
capable of answering those questions at low cost can be very useful as an early warning 
model, to identify potential vulnerabilities of the financial system, and could be used by 
supervisors as an alternative to the costly on-site visits that they make periodically to 
financial institutions considered at risk. 
We find that, as expected, differences in financial and prudence across institutions can 
explain the processes of failure and integration of banks and related financial 
institutions after the occurrence of a negative shock. While profitability and 
capitalization are the most important determinants of the probability of failing, bank´s 
size, efficiency and capitalization are the main determinants of the probability of 
integration. Changes in the level of capitalization matter for the happening of both a 
failure and a process of M&A. All else constant, an increase in capitalization reduces 
the probability of disappearing, whether due to the occurrence of bankruptcy, a merge 
or an acquisition. However, a marginal increase in capitalization reduces more the 
probability of bankruptcy than the probability of integration. Thus, conditional on 
having survived up to time t, an increase in capitalization is a good signal that the bank 
can be able to overcome the negative shock. If the observed increment in capitalization 
is sufficiently large, the institution will survive and remain unchanged. However, it is 
also possible that the observed increment in capitalization may not be sufficient for the 
bank to survive and remain unchanged, but rather be forced to make part of a M&A 
process in order not to go bankrupt. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the episode of 
financial crisis in Colombia. Section 3 is a literature review section. Section 4 presents 
the description of the data. Section 5 presents the empirical model used to find the 
determinants of the processes of failure and M&A of financial institutions, as well as 
estimation results. Finally, section 6 presents conclusions. 
 
2.  The financial crisis in Colombia of the late 20
th century 
Financial liberalization was a common factor among developing economies during the 
late 20
th century. The promised advantages of financial globalization led most emerging 
economies to liberalize their financial systems around the first half of the 1990s 
(Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2006). Colombia was not strange to this process of change, 
and at the beginning of the 1990s a program of financial liberalization was implemented. After a long period of financial restriction
6, conditions for the entrance of 
foreign investment were eased, promoting more competition in the financial system, and 
financial institutions were given more liberty in the management of financial operations 
and interest rates. 
The ratio of intermediated assets (loans plus bonds) to GDP increased from 31 percent 
in 1990 to 47 percent in 1996. The number of financial institutions raised significantly, 
the participation of the assets of foreign banks in the total assets of the system 
increased, and most of the government-owned financial institutions were privatized. 
As a consequence of the growth in the financial system and of the economic expansion 
that took place during the first half of the 1990s, between 1991 and 1997 Colombia 
registered a credit boom without precedent. The ratio of loans to GDP and the price of 
assets (financial and real) grew steadily, as did the number of intermediaries. But, as is 
often the case when quick expansion of credit follows financial liberalization, the 
quality of loans of financial institutions decreased, and this degradation of loan quality 
elevated the financial fragility of the economy (Minsky,1982). 
Between 1998 and 1999 a sudden capital reversion occurred, followed by a steep fall in 
the terms of trade, which led to a reduction in the aggregate level of expenditure. 
Internal demand fell while interest rates increased to historically high levels. The 
housing price bubble burst, while the prices of financial assets collapsed. The financial 
health of financial intermediaries damaged sharply. Loan quality decreased  (i.e., the 
rate of non-performing loans to total loans for the system increased from 7.9% in June 
1998 to 16% by the end of 1999), and the losses of financial institutions, which had 
very low levels of provisions, led to a reduction of capital and a worsening of 
capitalization. Many banks were liquidated, while others merged or were absorbed by 
other financial institutions. 
Overall, the period of financial stress generated a reduction in the size of the financial 
intermediation industry of Colombia and a change in the composition of the financial 
system´s assets. In terms of size, the ratio of intermediated assets to GDP fell to 38 
percent in 2000. In terms of asset composition, loans rendered up participation to 
securities. Lending policies became stricter. For instance, the ratio of provisions to loans 
of surviving institutions grew steadily. Concentration increased in the financial system, 
mainly due to the processes of liquidation and M&A of institutions that took place 
during the period of stress. 
Hand-by-hand with the financial crisis, Colombia experienced a deep economic 
recession. Between 1999 and 2003, growth slowed by 4.2% and investment by 34.6%.  
As shown by López and Rodríguez (2008), a financial accelerator mechanism à la 
                                                            
6 During the 1980s, Colombia´s financial institutions were imposed high reserve requirements and forced 
investments. Strong constraints on foreign investment existed, as well as on the types of operations 
intermediaries could do and on interest rates. Additionally, a process of bank nationalization was held 
during that decade. Bernanke et al (1999) was essential in creating the strong and persistent downturn in 
investment
7. 
Many other emerging economies suffered periods of financial distress during the late 
1990s
8. These financial crises, also observed after periods of rapid credit expansion, are 
well documented in the literature (for instance, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2001; Bae et al, 
2003; Carree, 2003; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004). For further reference on the 
Colombian financial crisis see Gómez-González and Kiefer (2009). 
 
3.  Literature review 
Bank failures and bank mergers and acquisitions have been traditionally studied 
separately. The literature on bank failures is ample. A good review of the early literature 
is presented by Demirguc-Kunt (1989). Different statistical techniques have been used 
to predict bank failures or to discriminate between sound banks and those prone to fail, 
mainly using data from financial institutions in the US. Among them are the Z-score, 
develop by Altman (1968) in order to forecast the probability of a bank entering 
bankruptcy within a two-year period; multivariate discriminant analysis, used by Sinkey 
(1975); event analysis, followed by Lane et al (1986) and Whalen (1991); logit 
regression, employed by West (1985), Thomson (1992), Kolari et al (2002), Mar-
Molinero and Serrano-Cinca (2001), Canbas et al (2005), among many others; hazard 
duration models, used for example by Wheelock and Wilson (1995), González-
Hermosillo et al (1996), Carree (2003), and Gómez-González and Kiefer (2009). Most 
of these studies use data on banks´ financial ratios during periods of financial distress, 
and agree in the finding that differences in financial health of banks explain to a large 
extent the observed patterns of bankruptcy. 
Regarding mergers and acquisitions, the empirical literature can be divided into two 
groups. The first one corresponds to studies on the causes and consequences of M&A 
events (efficiency gains or losses, for example). The second one consists of empirical 
analyses using probability models to estimate the likelihood of participating in these 
actions. Regarding the second group of studies, the seminal works are those of Hannan 
and Rhoades (1987) and Amel and Rhoades (1989). Both studies use data from banks in 
the US and estimate logit models to identify significant factors determining the 
probability of an integration process. Focarelli et al (2002) conducts a similar study for 
M&A of Italian banks during a large period of time. Other studies use duration analysis 
to estimate the conditional probability of participating in a consolidation process ( for 
example, Hannan and Pilloff, 2009, and Ayala et al, 2007). 
There are a few papers on the determinants of integration processes that have used 
competing risks models to model separately the chance of participating in a process of 
                                                            
7 This is not a surprising result, given that in Colombia firms are highly bank-dependent. Huertas et al 
(2005) show that near 60 percent of total firms´ funding is provided by financial institutions.  
8 Mexico, 1994-95; East Asian countries, 1997-98; Russian, 1998; and, Brazil, 1998-99. M&A as an acquiring entity or as an acquired firm. One interesting recent example is 
García-Suaza and Gómez-González (forthcoming). 
In contrast with the studies on bank failure, research on the determinants of the 
probability of observing a merger or acquisition use data on banks for prolonged time-
periods. One reason of doing so relates with the fact that many mergers and acquisitions 
do not correspond to a safeguard strategy followed by a bank to avoid failure, but 
correspond to a strategy followed by two or more institutions in order to gain market 
power. During tranquil times it is to expect that most M&A processes correspond to the 
second type of strategy (the search of greater market power), while during times of 
distress it is to expect that most of these processes correspond to the first type of 
strategy (Focarelli et al, 2002). Studies on M&A, then, use both data on financial ratios 
of banks and macroeconomic data to predict the occurrence of integration events. Most 
of these studies find that both types of variables matter. 
All of the above mentioned studies focus on two-state worlds where only two outcomes 
are possible. For traditional studies on bank failure, the two possible states of nature are 
survival and liquidation. In this case, M&A are either modeled as censured data or 
ignored. For studies on M&A, the only possible final outcomes are survival as an 
independent entity and fusion, while bank failures are either modeled as censured data 
or ignored. Only a limited number of papers have studied simultaneously the transition 
from survival to either liquidation or integration. The seminal study is Wheelock and 
Wilson (2000), who use competing risks hazards models to identify characteristics that 
make individual banks in the US more likely to fail or to be acquired. A related recent 
paper is Brown and Dinc (forthcoming), who study bank failures in a group of emerging 
market countries in the 1990s. Their interest, however, is to check whether observed 
differences in the strength of the banking systems across countries influences the 
likelihood of the Government in taking over or closing a failing bank. 
There are no studies on the competing risks of failing or merging for emerging 
economies. This paper is the first to present a competing risks hazard model to 
simultaneously identify covariates that excerpt significant influence on the probability 
of failing or merging for banks of an emerging economy. This study is close in spirit to 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000). However, unlike them we focus in a period of financial 
distress, namely the financial crisis experienced by Colombia during the late 1990s
9. 
We benefit from an unusually rich database that offers us two advantages with respect 
to previous studies. First, survival is measured on a monthly scale, which helps us 
identify more precisely the moment of failure or integration of financial institutions
10. 
Second, due to Colombia´s financial crisis, there are enough failures and integrations to 
identify and measure significant effects of financial variables. 
                                                            
9 Wheelock and Wilson use information for the period 1984-1993. They use a larger time-span in order to 
record enough failures and mergers and acquisitions to be used in their empirical work. 
10 Most of the previous studies use quarterly data, which is the frequency in which financial institutions 
report their balances to the supervisors in many countries. 4.  Description of the data 
This paper studies failures and M&A during the Colombian financial crisis of the late 
1990s. The period of observation is the 48 months between January 1997 and December 
2000. Data are observed in a monthly frequency. Financial data as of January 1997 was 
collected for each of the banks
11 that existed that date
12. Some studies on bank failure 
only include in the sample a subset of the group of banks. For example, Oshinsky and 
Olin (2005) study only banks in trouble, defining them as those that receive a composite 
CAMELS rating of either 4 or 5 when examined. However, not only banks that actually 
change of state or that are more likely to change of state ex-ante provide valuable 
information to understand bank failures and M&A. Solid banks, or banks that have a 
lower chance ex-ante to change of state, also provide valuable information. 
Following previous studies and theoretical expectations, the following financial ratios 
were included as covariates: capitalization (CAP), defined as the ratio of equity to 
assets; management efficiency (EFF), approximated by the ratio of operating expenses 
to average annual assets (this variables is in fact constructed as a proxy of inefficiency); 
profitability of assets (PROF), given by the ratio of annualized profits to average annual 
assets; liquidity (LIQ) defined as the ratio of short-term liabilities to liquid assets; and, a 
market based variable (SIZE), defined as the natural logarithm of the bank´s assets. 
These financial indicators are proxies of the variables traditionally considered in the 
literature. 
The data set used to construct the covariates consists of information in the balance 
sheets that financial institutions report periodically to the Financial Superintendence of 
Colombia
13. Table 1 shows a summary of these variables. Information is reported for 
the average of surviving institutions, for the average of institutions that merged or were 
acquired, and for the average of failed institutions. 
Note from table 1 that institutions that survived the period of financial distress showed 
in January 1997 better indicators of financial health that other institutions on average. 
They were better capitalized, more efficient, and more profitable. It is very interesting to 
note that there are also notable ex-ante differences between failed banks and banks that 
integrated with others during the period. Particularly, banks that participated in an 
M&A process showed better financial indicators at the beginning of the observation 
period than banks that finally went to bankruptcy. If only survival and bank failure were 
considered, information on banks that participated in an integration process during 
                                                            
11 Our data collects information on commercial banks and financial companies. Financial companies in 
Colombia are quite similar to commercial banks (they are “small” banks). Indeed, as it is shown below, 
both have statistically identical survival functions for the period of study. Thus, we treat them indistinctly 
as banks.  
12 In this paper we do not report results when time-varying covariates are included given the question of 
interest that was presented in the introductory section. Additionally, specification tests for the assumption 
of proportional hazards indicate that a specification with time-fixed covariates is adequate. As a 
robustness check of the results reported here, we estimated an identical model with time-varying 
covariates. The results were fundamentally the same. 
13 The Financial Superintendence is the regulator of financial institutions in Colombia. times of financial distress would at the most be used as censured data. The inclusion of 
the “intermediate” state of the world (M&A) leads to a better understanding of the 
behavior of financial institutions during tough times.  
Table 1: Summary of the financial ratios used in the empirical analysis by type of 
institution 
Covariate  Surviving banks  M&A banks  Failed banks 
CAP 19.2%  15.4%  10.0% 
EFF 4.2%  4.7%  6.2% 
PROF 1.2% -0.0%  -1.3% 
LIQ 1.1%  1.0%  1.0% 
SIZE* 19.2  18.3  18.6 
Number of 
institutions  61 47 30 
*The values reported of the scale variable SIZE correspond to the natural logarithm of the 
institution´s total assets. 
Most pair-wise correlations between the included variables were small and in no case 
did one exceed 0.41 in absolute value (Table 2). We excluded from the empirical 
analysis variables that exhibited high pair-wise correlations with at least one of the 
covariates that appear in Table 1, to avoid potential problems of multicolinearity. 
Table 2: Pair-wise correlation matrix 
Covariate CAP  EFF  PROF  LIQ  SIZE 
CAP  1  0.29 -0.05 0.08 -0.33 
EFF 0.29  1  -0.41 0.27 -0.20 
PROF -0.05  -0.41  1  0.11  0.37 
LIQ 0.08 0.27 0.11  1  0.23 
SIZE -0.33 -0.20 0.37  0.23  1 
 
Interesting from Table 2, the linear correlation between CAP and PROF is low. The 
spearman correlation between both variables is also low and not statistically different 
from zero. The relation between current CAP and lagged PROF is also weak. Therefore, 
it appears to be the case that PROF is not a good predictor of CAP according to the data 
used in this empirical study. 
Regarding failure and integrations, the empirical probability of failure before 48 months 
after the occurrence of a strong negative shock is 21.7 percent (30 out of 138 
institutions failed). That percentage of failures is way above the percentage of failures in 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Carree (2003), and other related studies. However, the 
empirical probability of merging, acquiring, or being acquired is even higher: 34.1%. 
These high percentages show that the case of Colombia is a very interesting one to 
study. The large number of observed events allows a very fine measurement of the 
influence of individual variables on the probability of observing an event. 
 5.  Empirical model and estimation results 
We use a hazard function model to study the time to failure or participation in an 
integration process of financial institutions. This approach generalizes the more 
common binary response approach by modeling not only the occurrence of the event but 
also the time it takes an individual to change of state (allowing a more efficient use of 
the available information). Hazard function models applied to this problem can provide 
answers to questions that are relevant for both financial supervisors and financial 
institutions, such as: after the occurrence of a negative shock, what is the probability 
that a bank fails or participates in an integration process in the following months, given 
it has survived up to that moment? Or, what is the predicted time to state migration for a 
bank of some given characteristics? 
Preliminary analysis on the raw data (data not conditioned on covariates) showed that 
the survival functions of commercial banks and financial companies are statistically 
identical (Table 3). Therefore, we treat both types of institutions as one same group. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the hazard functions corresponding to failures and mergers and 
acquisitions. Both functions are clearly non-monotonic. The form of the estimated 
hazard functions
14 shows that the most commonly used parametric models for the 
distribution of duration do not seem to be appropriate for modeling the baseline hazards 
of the migrations considered in this study. Therefore, this paper estimates a proportional 
hazards model in which no parametric form is assumed for the baseline hazard function, 
following Cox (1972). As shown below using a specification test, this assumption 
seems to be appropriate for the problem of interest. Nonetheless, we also report results 
from estimations using three parametric distributions frequently used in the literature 
(Exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz) to compare the proportional hazards model with 
other models. 
 
Table 3: Tests for the equality of the survivor functions 
Null-hypothesis: Commercial banks and financial companies have identical survival 
functions between January 1997 and December 2000 
Test for failure 
Test Log-rank Cox Wilcoxon 
   (1)*  0.05  0.05  0.14 
Prob>  2  0.8273 0.8269 0.7132 
Test for M&A 
Test Log-rank Cox Wilcoxon 
   (1)*  1.01  1.03  1.19 
Prob>  2  0.3149 0.3102 0.2753 




14 Hazard functions are estimated here as a kernel smoothed difference of the Aalen-Hansen estimator of 
the cumulative hazard functions. We use an asymmetric Epanechnikov kernel function. Figure 1: Estimated smoothed hazard function – failures 
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated smoothed hazard function – M&A 
 
Under the proportional hazards specification the hazard rate takes the following 
multiplicative form (see, for example, Gómez-González and Hinojosa, 2010) 
   , , ,         ,               (1) 
The baseline hazard function,      , captures completely the effect of time on the 
hazard rate. We specify    ,            ´  , where X is a vector of covariates and   is 
the vector of parameters to be estimated. Under this specification, the coefficients can 
be given a partial derivative interpretation (Kiefer, 1988). In other words, each 
coefficient represents the constant, proportional effect of the corresponding covariate on 
the conditional probability of ending a spell. 
In this study, at every moment of time a surviving bank faces two competing risks. It 
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Smoothed hazard estimateof at most one of these risks will be observed. If the bank fails, the institution arrives to 
an absorbent state. Thus, its chances of participating in an M&A process vanish at that 
moment. If the bank integrates with another one, the original institution finds the end of 
its life while a new institution appears in the market. Thus, the original institution will 
no longer have a chance of failing (although the new institution has indeed a chance of 
both failing and integrating). 
In order to model appropriately the two risks we are considering, we use a competing 
risks model extension of the proportional hazards model presented above. Let F 
represent the event of failing and let I represent the event of participating in an 
integration process. Assuming these two events are independent
15, the hazard function 
at time t can be decomposed as the sum of the hazard functions for both types of risks: 
                            (2) 
In equation (2),       stands for the hazard function associated with risk     ,  . The 
survival function is computed as the product of the survival functions associated with 
each of the possible events. Thus 
                          (3) 
Suppose a bank makes a transition (either fails or makes part of an integration process) 
at time    . Its marginal contribution to the likelihood function,   , is then given by 
                           ,          (4) 
with         representing the probability density function of migrating to state   at time    
and         representing the survival function of remaining in a state different from  . A 
bank that does not migrate out of survival for the whole observation period (suppose T 
represents the total time-span during which transitions are observed) represents a 
censured observation. The marginal contribution of a censured observation,   , is given 
by 
                              (5) 
The total individual contribution, L, is calculated as 
     
    
    
               (6) 
In equation (6),    is an indicator function taking the value one when the individual is in 
state     ,  . 
                                                            
15Independence between the competing events is conventionally assumed in the literature (Wheelock and 
Wilson (2000); García-Suaza and Gómez-González, forthcoming). While dependent hazards can be 
modeled by using appropriate multivariate distributions, the data are not able to distinguish between 
dependent and independent models (Elandt-Johnson and Johnson, 1980). With the information available 
in this study it is impossible to test the null hypothesis of independence of the hazard functions, and it is 
also impossible to determine appropriately the structure of the possible dependence (see Lancaster, 1990). We estimated the corresponding proportional hazards competing risks model using the 
partial maximum likelihood method proposed by Cox (1972)
16. Ties in duration are 
handled by applying the method of Efron (1977)
17. Estimation results are shown in 
Table 4 (for the risk of failure) and Table 5 (for the risks of participating in an 
integration process). 
Table 4: Estimation results for duration to failure 
Covariate Proportional 
hazards+ 















































Log-likelihood  -123.75  -78.90 -71.81 -72.80 
LR    (5)++  24.07 18.27 24.67 24.54 
Prob>   0.0002  0.003  0.0002  0.0002 
+Standard errors in parenthesis. ++Degrees of freedom in parenthesis. 
*Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Note from Table 4 that estimation results for the determinants of the duration to bank 
failure are similar under the different models. Particularly, the signs of the coefficients 
remain unchanged as well as significance levels. In all four cases, the null hypothesis 
that none of the included variables affects significantly the probability of changing state 
is rejected at conventional significance levels. Regarding individual covariates, CAP 
and PROF are the most significant determinants of the duration of survival. The 
estimated sign for both variables is negative, indicating that an increase in one of these 
two variables leads to a decrease in the probability of failing, everything else constant. 
Given we showed above that parametric models do not represent appropriately the 
behavior of the unconditional baseline hazard function we focus in the proportional 
hazards model´s results. According to Table 4, a 1 percentage point increase in CAP 
leads to a 1.9 percent decrease in the probability of failing. Similarly, a 1 percentage 
point increase in annualized assets profitability reduces the hazard rate of failure in 1.7 
percent. 
                                                            
16 The parametric models, estimated for comparison purposes, are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
17 Hertz-Picciotto and Rockhill (1997) show that the Efron method for handling ties is to be the preferred, 
especially when the sample size is small either due to heavy censoring or from the outset. After controlling for appropriate financial health indicators, the size of a bank does not 
excerpt significant influence on the hazard rate of failure. This is an interesting result 
showing that there is no evidence that during Colombia´s financial crisis a too-big-to-
fail rescue policy was implemented by the financial sector regulator. 
Table 5: Estimation results for duration to participation in an integration process 
Covariate Proportional 
hazards+ 















































Log-likelihood  -201.19 -114.52 -111.05 -113.06 
LR    (5)++  22.68 21.63 25.61 24.05 
Prob>    0.0004 0.0006 0.0001 0.0002 
+Standard errors in parenthesis. ++Degrees of freedom in parenthesis. 
*Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
Table 5 presents estimation results for the determinants of the hazard rate of bank 
integration. Results are similar under the alternative estimated models. Focusing 
attention on the results of the proportional hazards model, CAP, EFF and SIZE are 
significant individual covariates affecting the transition from individual survival to 
participation in an M&A process. The estimated signs for the three variables are all 
positive, indicating that an increase in any of these three variables leads to a reduction in 
the migration probability under consideration. Note that EFF and SIZE, not significant 
for the transition to failure, are significant determinants of the probability of 
participating in an M&A process. Larger banks are less likely to integrate with others. A 
probable explanation derives from regulation. There are laws that limit concentration in 
the banking industry. Therefore, there exists a threshold size over which an institution 
can no longer expand. 
Increases in EFF (increases in inefficiency) reduce the probability of merging or being 
acquired. Therefore, all else constant, an inefficient institution finds it difficult to 
associate with others during times of financial distress. It has to try to survive alone. If 
additionally the institution is poorly capitalized or unprofitable, it will most likely fail.  
Of particular interest, CAP is a statistically significant determinant of the two 
competing transitions studied in this paper. However, the effect of a marginal increase 
in CAP affects differently the probability of transition to each of the alternative states. While a one percentage point increase in CAP decreases the hazard rate of bank failure 
in 1.9 percent, it decreases the hazard rate of participating in an M&A process in just 
1.3 percent. Recall the hazard rate represents the instantaneous conditional probability 
of changing of state. Therefore, a 60 basis points difference is a considerable one.  
This result can be interpreted in the following way. All else constant, after a negative 
shock happens an increase in capitalization reduces the probability a bank has of 
disappearing, whether due to the occurrence of bankruptcy, a merge, or an acquisition. 
However, a marginal increase in capitalization reduces more the probability of 
bankruptcy than the probability of integration. Thus, conditional on having survived up 
to time t, an increase in capitalization is a good signal that the bank can be able to 
overcome the negative shock. If the observed increment in capitalization is sufficiently 
large, the institution will survive and remain unchanged. However, it is also possible 
that the observed increment in capitalization may not be sufficient for the bank to 
survive and remain unchanged, but rather be forced to make part of a M&A process in 
order not to go bankrupt. 
A related alternative way of understanding the effect of CAP is as follows. After the 
financial system experiences a negative shock, the shareholders of a troubled bank can 
choose whether or not to increase the bank´s capital. If they decide not to capitalize the 
bank, the chance it fails increases. On the other hand, they have the opportunity to avoid 
failure by capitalizing the bank. Their decision is a strategic one. They can decide to 
increase the institution´s capital significantly in order to guarantee it will be able to 
survive in its current state. Alternatively, they can decide to increase capital less, in a 
way sufficient enough to be able to merge with another bank, or to make the bank 
attractive so that others acquire it. 
From the supervisor´s viewpoint the result has an important policy implication. Using 
the model presented above, the supervisor can decide during times of financial distress 
which is the best policy to implement with respect to banks in distress in order to 
achieve financial stability. Bank by bank, they can decide whether they must intervene 
an institution or not and, in case an intervention is decided, which intervention is more 
adequate to preserve financial soundness. 
Table 6 presents evidence that the proportional hazards assumption is adequate for our 
sample. The proportional hazards factorization implies that the effect of the covariates 
on the hazard function is constant over time. This hypothesis can be tested using the 
Schoenfeld´s residual test, which tests for a zero slope in a generalized linear regression 
of the residuals on time. The null hypothesis of the test is that the slope is zero. A 
rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the proportional hazards assumption is 
unsuitable. 
 
 Table 6: Schoenfeld´s residuals test results 
  Failure hazard  M&A hazard 
Covariate        Pr>         Pr>   
CAP 0.248  1.77 0.1837  -0.177 1.41 0.2351 
EFF  0.093  0.28 0.5995  -0.136 0.70 0.4045 
PROF 0.019  0.01 0.9360  0.195  1.69 0.1932 
LIQ  0.323  2.14 0.1434  0.112  0.55 0.4569 
SIZE 0.180  0.84 0.3582  0.089  0.35 0.5552 
Global 
test   6.87  0.2305   6.49  0.2612 
 
Table 6 shows results for a test of each covariate as well as for a global test. Note that 
the null hypothesis of a zero slope cannot be rejected in any case. Therefore, the 
Schoenfeld´s residuals test provides evidence that the proportional hazards specification 
is adequate in this study. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper studies the processes of failure and M&A of financial institutions in 
Colombia during the financial crisis of the late 1990s. We use an especially rich data set 
comprised of monthly information on banks´ balance sheets for the period January 1997 
– December 2000. Our hypothesis is that during times of financial distress some 
institutions participate in integration processes as a strategy to survive. However, not all 
institutions are allowed to participate in such processes. Particularly, those banks whose 
financial health deteriorates profoundly do not find partners to merge and are not 
acquired, and therefore are more likely to be liquidated than peers in better financial 
conditions. 
The case of Colombia is worthy of studying because during the late 1990s and early 
2000s many bankruptcies and M&A processes took place in the financial sector, due to 
the financial crisis and to the process of consolidation of an incipient banking system. 
We use a competing risks hazard duration model with time-fixed covariates which 
allows us to answer relevant question such as: after the occurrence of a negative shock, 
what is the probability that a bank fails (or, alternatively, participates in an M&A 
process) in the following months, given it has survived up to that moment? Or, what is 
the predicted time to failure (alternatively, participation in an M&A process) for a bank 
of some given characteristics? A model capable of answering those questions at low 
cost can be very useful as an early warning model, to identify potential vulnerabilities of 
the financial system, and could be used by supervisors as an alternative to the costly on-
site visits that they make periodically to financial institutions considered at risk. 
Additionally, using the model supervisors can decide during times of financial distress 
which is the best policy to implement with respect to troubled banks in order to achieve 
financial stability. The vast majority of studies in the literature on the behavior of banks during periods of 
financial distress focus on two-state worlds where only two outcomes are possible. For 
traditional studies on bank failure, the two possible states of nature are survival and 
liquidation. For studies on M&A, the only possible final outcomes are survival as an 
independent entity and fusion. Only a limited number of papers have studied 
simultaneously the transition from survival to either liquidation or fusion at the same 
time. However, during times of difficulties, bankruptcy and integration are risks faced 
simultaneously by financial institutions. 
This paper is the first to present a competing risks hazard model to identify covariates 
that excerpt significant influence on the probability of failing or merging for banks of an 
emerging economy. Specification tests show that the proportional hazard specification 
is appropriate for our sample. This study is close in spirit to Wheelock and Wilson 
(2000). However, unlike them we focus in a period of financial distress. 
We find that differences in financial health and prudence across institutions can explain 
the processes of failure and integration of banks and related financial institutions after 
the occurrence of a negative shock. While profitability and capitalization are the most 
important determinants of the probability of failing, bank´s size, efficiency and 
capitalization are the main determinants of the probability of integration. Changes in the 
level of capitalization matter for the happening of both a failure and a process of M&A. 
All else constant, an increase in capitalization reduces the probability of disappearing, 
whether due to the occurrence of bankruptcy, a merge or an acquisition. However, a 
marginal increase in capitalization reduces more the probability of bankruptcy than the 
probability of integration. Thus, conditional on having survived up to time t, an increase 
in capitalization is a good signal that the bank can be able to overcome the negative 
shock. If the observed increment in capitalization is sufficiently large, the institution 
will survive and remain unchanged. However, it is also possible that the observed 
increment in capitalization may not be sufficient for the bank to survive by its own, but 
rather be forced to make part of a M&A process in order not to go bankrupt. 
Our model can become an important tool for bank supervisors in emerging countries. It 
can serve as an early warning tool and, at the same time, can help supervisors decide 
which policies are best to implement in order to promote financial stability. 
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